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MULTI-PERIOD DEA INCENTIVE REGULATION IN
ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION
PER J. AGRELL, PETER BOGETOFT AND JØRGEN TIND
Abstract. Multi-period multi-product regulatory schemes for electricity dis-
tributors are presented, based on cost information from a productivity analysis
model and an agency theoretical decision model. The proposed schemes are
operational and demonstrate considerable advantages compared to the popu-
lar CPI-X revenue cap regulation. The schemes avoid arbitrariness, too high
or negative informational rents as well as ratchet e¤ects and they promote
rapid productivity catch-up by making full use of available data. More gen-
erally, the paper contributes to the theoretical uni…cation between …rm-based
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) productivity models and micro-economic
reimbursement theories.
1. Introduction
Irrespective of ownership, either investor owned or publicly owned utilities, any
natural monopoly poses a risk to the society by accruing excess pro…ts and costs at
the expense of the members of the population that are dependent on its services.
The problem is a principal-agent problem under asymmetric information with the
society (the customers represented by a regulator) as the principal and the utility
( a n di t sm a n a g e r )a st h ea g e n t .
In case of perfect information, the principal would o¤er the agent a compensation
scheme corresponding to the minimal cost for the desired level of service and the
agent would accept the o¤er at zero pro…t. Sometimes, the cost function can be
estimated using prior knowledge about the industry or using information acquired
through a bidding procedure, such as in a public procurement setting.
Generally, however, the natural monopolies (gas, water, electricity) exhibit very
varying exogenous preconditions such as customer pro…le and density, climate and
topology. This makes the direct assessment of the cost function di¢cult. Under
such circumstances, regulators of have often resorted to in‡ation adjusted revenue
caps with stipulated annual productivity improvements, the CPI-X model. How-
ever, such revenue caps are associated with severe limitations on the theoretical
and operational side, leaving a great deal of the regime open to arbitrariness. This
paper deals with the speci…c conditions pertaining to regulation of the Scandina-
vian electricity distribution industry and suggests a regulatory framework based on
e¢ciency benchmarking and incentive theory. The results may be applied to other
regulated industries with multiple-input, multiple-output characteristics as well.
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From a theoretical viewpoint, this paper extends earlier results joining Data En-
velopment Analysis (DEA) cost norms with the modern approach to regulation,
based on agency theory. In particular, the models in Bogetoft (1997, 1999, 2000)
and Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind (2000) are taken as a starting point for the dynamic
framework. The emphasis of this paper, however, is not on the derivation of the-
oretical results per se. Rather, we stress the application to practical regulatory
problems in a particular industry. By o¤ering a comparison to the popular CPI-X
scheme and to a more advanced DEA-based cost scheme implemented in Norway,
the paper provides a fragment to a regulatory manual.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the most
common regulatory models and in Section 3 we review the literature on the e¢ciency
of Nordic electricity distribution. The basic DEA benchmarking model is developed
in Section 4. The DEA based regulatory model is developed in the single-period
single-agent case in Section 5 and in the multiple-period multiple-agent case in
Section 6. An illustration with the current regulatory policy in Norway is presented
in Section 7. The paper ends with some conclusions and suggestions for further work
in Section 8.
2. Regulation of Electricity Distribution
Various regulation regimes have been applied to electricity distribution: nation-
alization, cost-plus regulation, rate-of-return regulation, CPI-X revenue caps, and
yardstick competitions. The idea behind nationalization is to gain an informational
advantage and use this to maximize the social welfare, e.g., by introducing marginal
cost pricing. Anecdotal evidence of low cost e¢ciency and resulting high costs has
caused the wide-spread abandonment of this option in the favor of privatization.
Cost-plus regulation is likewise an early low-powered alternative with incentives
for over-investment and ine¢ciency. Rate-of-return regulation is currently found in
many countries, including the United States, as a low-powered option that regu-
lates the pro…tability of the industry. Early studies by Averch and Johnson (1962)
point out the incentives for overcapitalization to increase the rate base with this
regime. Empirical evidence summarized below suggests that this was the case for
the Scandinavian distribution industry before the recent reorganization.
CPI-X revenue cap regulation is a high-powered regime. It has been applied to
power distribution, e.g., in England and Wales (cf. Pollitt, 1995). Liston (1993)
shows that the …xed income induces cost e¢ciency by the agent’s cost minimization.
However, several theoretical and practical problems are associated with the CPI-X
model:
² If the cap is set too low, the result may be non-participation or bankruptcy.
² If the cap is too loose, the informational rents will be excessive.
² The update of the cap encourages strategic behavior on behalf of the agents,
who fear being penalized in subsequent periods for productivity improvements
(the ratchet e¤ect), cf. Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) and Weitzman
(1980)
² The cap basis lacks foundation. CPI does not necessarily have any connection
to the input prices. The improvement factor X, in its turn, lacks solid spec-
i…cation. In setting out to combine historical performance with conjectures
about future developments, it often requires bargaining with industry, further
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² The CPI-X model does not accommodate changes in the output pro…le. Hereby,
the revenue cap regulation gives disincentives to technological investments and
quality development.
The yardstick competition regime (Shleifer, 1985) is a recent addition to the
regulatory arsenal. The idea is to set an individual cost target for each distributor
that equals the realized cost by the other (comparable) agents. If the residual
pro…t is retained by the distributor, the yardstick competition provides an optimal
incentive scheme in solving the …rst two of the CPI-X problems stated above. Its
endogenous determination of the cost norm solves the arbitrariness problem. The
main problems of the basic yardstick model are the lack of dynamics, the single-
dimensional production description, its inability to accommodate changes in the
output pro…le, the comparability between agents and the distribution of risk.
The key to e¤ective regulation is found in the access to information. We argue
that by utilizing the maximum amount of information in the regulation and by
reducing the regulatory lag, …ve positive e¤ects are obtained. First, by tailoring
the revenue cap to the individual agent in a close sense, the total informational rent
is minimized. Second, by reducing the time lag from evaluation to reimbursement
and repeating the evaluation more frequently the risk and the consequences of mis-
representing an agent in a yardstick sense are minimized. Third, by excluding the
evaluated unit from the basis of comparison, the ratchet e¤ect can be e¤ectively
dealt with. Fourth, by using observed production cost rather the estimated con-
sumer prices, the arbitrariness of the CPI may be avoided. Similarly, the need of
postulating a negotiated X factor may be substituted by an actually realized pro-
ductivity improvements. Fifth, by using the richer production description in DEA,
changes in production pro…le can easily be taken into account.
3. Nordic Efficiency Studies
The Scandinavian electricity market has been undergoing a major transformation
since the late 1990s, heading towards the world’s largest free-competition electricity
market. In the deregulation, each of the four functions of the electricity sector
(production, transmission, distribution and retail) is met with a di¤erent market
form. The energy production and retail markets in Norway, Sweden and Finland has
constituted a free market since the end of the millennium, whereas the liberalization
process in Denmark is likely to be delayed for a few more years. The transmission
industry in Sweden and Norway is allotted to a state monopoly, analogously to the
road and railway systems in these countries. The distribution market, as a natural
monopoly, will be subject to various regulation regimes in the four countries and it
thus provides an excellent showcase for the potential strengths and weaknesses of
the applied theory.
The appropriateness of a particular regulatory policy foremost depends on the
prevailing conditions in the industry and the societal demands that the policy sets
out to protect. The e¢ciency of the Nordic electricity distribution market has
attracted a considerable attention from industry research organizations as the lib-
eralization of the market was within sight.
Torgersen (1993), Kittelsen and Torgersen (1993) and Kittelsen (1994) investi-
gate the Norwegian electricity distribution system. Kittelsen (1994) uses a data
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transmission losses in MWh, external services bought) and three outputs (length of
power lines, total power deliveries, number of customers). The models in Kittelsen
and Torgersen (1993) and Kittelsen (1993) are similar, di¤ering in some additional
outputs and inputs and variables to account for background factors. The …ndings
point out the presence of signi…cant technical ine¢ciency for the distributors, an
estimated waste of around 25% of the resources consumed, valued up to 1,8 billion
NOK. Their natural monopoly status has in this case lead to a disguised ine¢ciency
rather than excess pro…ts, which would have been expected. The authors conclude
that there is a strong need for an e¢ciency-improving incentive system and make a
case for maximum price regulation to replace the pro…t-based system. The quality
dimension of the service is accounted for, either by a delivery insurance system or
through delivery thresholds (e.g., minimum capacity).
Studies from the other Scandinavian countries con…rm the impression of consid-
erable ine¢ciencies in the industry, as given in Table 1.
Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992a, 1992b) and Veiderpass (1992), reporting on
a study of Swedish electricity distributors during the period from 1970 to 1986, af-
…rm lasting labor ine¢ciencies and unevenly distributed information rents. Agrell
and Bogetoft (2000) study the 1997 cost e¢ciency of 234 electricity distributors,
modeling a short-term activity with …xed grid capital. The Danish electricity distri-
bution is discussed in Hougaard (1994), reporting an average ine¢ciency of 20-40%
of the resource consumption regardless of company size. The Danish study indicate
a connection between overpricing and ine¢ciency, suggesting that in particular pri-
vate households bear the cost of technical ine¢ciency. Further, public utilities are
shown to be less e¢cient than private and cooperative companies in Denmark, as
opposed to the Swedish case where Veiderpass (1992) did not …nd any connection
between ownership and e¢ciency. Some details from the studies are given in Table
1.
In summary, there is substantial evidence of ine¢ciency in the industry, amount-
ing to large potential cost savings. This prompts for the development and active
application of e¤ective and ‡exible regulatory approaches, in the long-term interest
of industry and customers alike.
Table 1. Summary of frontier analyses of Nordic electricity distributors.
Country Techn. e¤. Cost e¤. Alloc. e¤. Obs. Year
Sweden (Veiderpass, 1992) 77% - - 285 1985
Sweden (Agrell-Bogetoft, 2000) - 73% - 234 1997
Norway (Kittelsen, 1994) 93% 72% 77% 171 1989
Denmark (Hougaard, 1994) 78% - - 82 1991
4. The DEA-Benchmarking Model
The idea behind the frontier benchmarking model is to take multiple inputs and
outputs into account in order to compare decision making units (DMU), here dis-
tributors. The inherent di¢culty with benchmarking is that all DMU have private
information about their ability to transform inputs into outputs, which enables
them to extract information rents. The objective of the regulator is to minimize
the extraction of information rents while assuring a satisfactory service. Normal
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transmission lines in km) and energy (transmission losses in MWh). It is assumed
that inputs are to be minimized for each given level of outputs, with the excep-
tion of capital, which may be treated as a …xed input if the period of regulation is
too short. The particular conditions that di¤erentiate distributors are called non-
controllable inputs, e.g., customer density, climate zone and other environmental
factors outside of our control. Kittelsen (1993) uses a corrosion index, maximum
power and customer pro…le as categorical variables that are eliminated through a
step-wise procedure. Non-controllable inputs are not minimized, but included in
the model to assure comparable technologies. E.g., it would be meaningless to
compare delivered power/employee hours for a rural and a municipal distribution
company, since the technology from the municipal distributor cannot be used in a
rural setting. Without loss of generality, the non-controllable inputs are formulated
so that a lower value signi…es a more favorable condition. By means of the inputs,
under in‡uence of the non-controllable inputs, a set of outputs is produced. The
outputs are found as revenue generators, i.e., an increase in outputs corresponds
to a proportional increase in revenue. In addition to the amount of delivered elec-
tricity (MWh, divided into household and industrial customers) and peak power
capacity (MW), the number of customers (divided into house-holds and industrial
customers) is included since a …xed annual charge is debited. Note that all inputs
and outputs are given in real terms, even when prices exist. This is done to separate
the price-e¤ect from pure resource allocation, enabling us to reuse past production
data to construct future cost norms.
To formalize the above, we assume that each of n DMUs, say DMUi; transform
mx controllable inputs xi and mz non-controllable categorical inputs zi into my
outputs yi. The prices, if existing, on the controllable inputs and outputs are
wi 2 R
mx
+ and pi 2 R
my
+ :
We assume that the technological possibilities are the same for all DMUs’ (except
for the di¤erences captured by the non-controllable) variables. Speci…cally, these
possibilities may be thought of as the set T of feasible input -output combinations
T = f(x;z;y)j(x;z) can produce yg
We shall generally assume that T satisfy
Condition 1. Free disposability: (x;z;y) 2 T;x0 ¸ x;z0 ¸ z;0 · y0 · y =)
(x0;z0;y0) 2 T:
Condition 2. Convexity: T is convex.
Condition 3. r returns to scale, (x;z;y) 2 T =) (qx;z;qy) 2 T;8q 2 K (r);where
k =" crs";"drs;" or "vrs"; and K(crs)=<0;K(drs)=[ 0 ;1] and K (vrs)=f1g,
respectively.
The associated underlying cost model for a DMU is given by
C(yjz;w)=m i n
x fwxj(x;z;y) 2 Tg
Given n observations of feasible production plans (xi;zi;yi) the DEA based cost
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The second constraint e¤ectively sorts the observations using the categoric variable
z, cf. Agrell and Tind (2000). The DEA based cost function gives the minimal cost
of producing the output for any output vector given the local factor prices and the
local non-controllable conditions.
To develop the setting into a full regulatory model we shall make some behavioral
a s s u m p t i o n sa sw e l l .
Assume that the DMU’s actual cost in the planning period is the minimal cost
C(yjz;w) plus whatever slack s 2 R0 is introduced in the production process, i.e.
c(y)=C(yjz;w)+s
Note that production slack is summarized here as an additional cost, i.e., it is one-
dimensional. The DMU (agent) knows C(yjz;w) but the regulator (principal) does
not. He does, however, know the input and outputs in n feasible (historical or
inferred) production plans, i.e.
(xi;zi;yi) 2 R
mx+my+mz
0 i =1 ;::;n
Drawing on the information from the n production plans, the regulator can infer
from the minimal extrapolation property of the DEA model that
C(yjz;w) · CDEA(yjz;w) 8y;z;w
The regulator has no more certain information about the cost structure. For-
mally, we let the regulator’s belief about the likelihood of the di¤erent cost functions
be given by the probability distribution
p(:):C! R0
on the class C of increasing convex r return to scale functions satisfying the above
inequalities. The belief distribution represents whatever additional information the
regulator has and it is used to close the model as a Bayesian Game.
The objective of the regulator is to minimize the costs of inducing the DMU to
accept a contract to produce y. The output y is assumed exogenously given and
k n o w n ,a st h ed e m a n df o rt h ep r o d u c e dg o o di sf a i r l yi n e l a s t i ca n ds t a b l e .
The DMU maximizes the weighted sum of pro…t and slack, the utility function
UA =( b ¡ wx)+½(wx¡ c(y))
where b 2 R is the revenue cap, wx is the actual cost and y is the implemented
production plan. The parameter ½ 2 [0;1] is the relative value of slack versus pro…ts
for the DMU. The DMU’s reservation utility is assumed to be 0; without loss of
generality.
From a social point of view it is important which production plans are selected
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costs chosen by the DMU and let y[C] be the production plan that is implemented.
We shall then say that the outcome is cost e¢cient if and only if
c[C]=C(y[C]jz;w) 8C 2C
such that outputs are produced without cost slack, i.e. at minimal cost.
5. Single-period Single-unit DEA Regulation
In the particular application, the regulator has access to high-quality veri…able
cost information c[C]. Extending model (PV 1) in Bogetoft (2000), we formulate the
single-period regulatory problem with veri…able actual costs (PV ) as
min §c2C b[c[C]]p(C)
b;c(C)
s:t: b[c[C]] ¡ c[C]+½(c[C] ¡ C(yjz;w)) ¸ 0 8C 2C (IR)
b[c[C]] ¡ c[C]+½(c[C] ¡ C(yjz;w)) ¸
b[c0] ¡ c0 + ½(c0 ¡ C(yjz;w))
8C;c0 :
C(yjz;w)) · c0 · b[c0] (IC)
b[c0] 2 R 8c0 2 R0
The individual rationality (IR) constraints ensure that the DMU is willing to par-
ticipate and use the cost strategy c[C]. The incentive compatibility (IC) constraints
ensure that this strategy is in fact the best possible strategy to use. The regulator
tries to minimize the resulting expected payments to the DMU subject to these
constraints.
Our next proposition characterizes the solution to this contracting problem with
veri…able costs c. The proposition extend the result of proposition 2 in Bogetoft
(2000) to the present setting.
Proposition 1. An optimal solution (bV [c];c V [c]) to the single period contract de-
sign problem with veri…able actual costs (PV ) is given by
cV [C]=C(yjz;w) (cost e¢ciency)
bV [c]=c + ½[CDEA(yjz;w) ¡ c] (DEA-yardstick)
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 can be developed using the same ideas as used
in Bogetoft (2000). We leave out the details here
Proposition 1 gives that the regulatory scheme using full cost reimbursement
and a DEA-yardstick promotes cost e¢cient production, i.e. no slack. The DMU
has incentive to participate and the regulator minimizes the cost of asymmetric
information by making full use of the available cost-information.
From a practical point of view, the advantage of this scheme is that it provides an
operational yardstick evaluation. It uses that cost slack is less valuable than pro…t
to the DMU, but equally expensive for the regulator to provide. A disadvantage of
t h es c h e m ei so fc o u r s et h a tt h er e l a t i v ev a l u eo fs l a c k½ may not be easy to assess.
An opportunistic DMU will try to signal a high value of ½ in order to increase his
informational rents. However, as long as we can at least …nd an upper bound on
the value of ½, we can use this as the basis for compensation and the IR and IC
constraints will be ful…lled for all smaller values of ½ (Bogetoft, 1997).
Example 1. Consider a slightly masked distributor (A) from the set of Norwegian
distributors NVE (1997), with data for model CDEA(yjz;w) as in Table 2 below.8 PER J. AGRELL, PETER BOGETOFT AND JØRGEN TIND
Using the entire data set as reference, the DEA cost norm of the distributor is
determined to 72.2 MNOK compared to the actual cost 81.98 MNOK. This estimate
is based only on distributors that have a climate zoning equal or worse than A
and an inverted customer density not less than that of A. The contract o¤ered in
Table 2, using a slack value ½ =0 :25, gives A a bonus amounting to a fourth
of the di¤erence between the attained costs and the DEA cost norm. Since the
DEA norm is an upper bound to the true cost function C (yjz;w); it is feasible
for A to attain cost e¢ciency. With the current value of slack, ½ =0 :25,Ai s
indi¤erent between C (yjz;w)=7 2 ;200 kNOK and further improvements of the
operational cost. In case A does not lower the costs for an unchanged output y;
the revenue cap b(81;980) = 81;980 + ½(72;200 ¡ 81;980) = 79;535 kNOK will
e¤ectively discourage the consumption of slack, 81;980 ¡ 72;200 = 9;780 kNOK
since the cash loss, valued at 2;445 kNOK, amounts to the utility value of the slack.
Table 2. Data for electricity distributor A.
Category Name Amount Unit Price, w Unit
Output, y Clients 29,114
Delivered energy 848,070 MWh
Input, x Labor 97 fte 285,215 NOK/fte
Losses 57,989 MWh 149 NOK/MWh
Capital 547,410 kNOK 10.1 %
Non-controllable inputs Climate zone 5
Customer space 0.535 km2
Table 3. Reimbursement for electricity distributor A.
Category Amount Unit
Historical cost, wx 81,980 kNOK
CDEA(yjz;w) 72,200 kNOK
Slack value, ½ 25 %
Revenue cap, b(c) c +0 :25(72;200 ¡ c) kNOK
Revenue cap, b(72;200) 72,200 kNOK
Revenue cap, b(70;000) 70,550 kNOK
6. Multi-period Multi-unit DEA Regulation
The relevance of a multiple period regulatory regime is quite obvious. Speci…c
investments are not likely to be undertaken at the optimal level unless the regulatory
principles are settled for at least some years. Thus, it is natural to think of the
historical data as referring to a prior review period and to assume that the regulator
commits to a regulatory system for periods 1;:::;T: This is depicted in Figure 1
below.
We will now extend our single-period regulatory scheme to an operational multi-
period model. Let yi
1;:::yi





T the non-controllable categoric variables over the planning period
t =1 ;:::;T.
The regulator now faces two fundamental problems. The …rst problem is a simple
control problem of inducing small cost in any given period given the available in-
formation. The second problem is a simple learning problem of taking into account
the progressively revealed information about the costs.MULTI-PERIOD DEA INCENTIVE REGULATION IN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION 9
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Figure 1. Timeline for the multi-period regulatory review period.
The …rst planning mode is usually referred to as the here-and-now planning or












at the outset of the planning period and to stick to these levels for the full planning
period. This is relatively simple approach. The regulator develops the cost model at
the outset of the planning period and uses it to determine revenue caps throughout
the period. The DMU is willing to accept such a contract.
Instead of …xing the standards in the base year 0,i tm a yb ea d v a n t a g e o u st o
re-estimate the cost structure every year as more an more information accumulate.
This can be done without adversely a¤ecting the DMUs behavior, i.e. without the
drawback of rachet e¤ect, as long as no DMU a¤ects its own norm. This is the












t =1 ;::;T (6.1)
where C
DEA¡i
t is the DEA cost model using the historical information from all but
the evaluated unit plus the base period information about the evaluated unit,
C
DEA¡i




















This scheme has numerous advantages, in comparison to the CPI-X regulation.
The main advantage of this planning mode is that it utilizes information as it be-
comes available. It hereby eliminates the problem of excessive rents, cf. proposition
1, as well as the risk of bankruptcy due to overestimated productivity improvement
potentials. The resulting cost norm, as well as any derived productivity improve-
ment rate X, are endogenously determined by the actual performance of the oper-
ators. Moreover, the scheme explicitly addresses the ratchet e¤ect. In a repeated
relationship, if the regulator can set up a target based on the DMU’s previous per-
formance, the DMU will anticipate the in‡ation of targets and he will then disguise
his potentials by reducing output in earlier periods to earn more long term pro…ts.
To handle this drawback, we use CDEA¡i
t (yjz;w) i n s t e a do fa na l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g
reference technology, based on all information for all DMUs. This may not be the
least expensive way to cope with the ratchet e¤ect, but certainly pragmatic and10 PER J. AGRELL, PETER BOGETOFT AND JØRGEN TIND
feasible. Based on the DEA multi-output technology, the model copes elegantly
with the problem concerning changes in input and/or output pro…le. Finally, price
changes are accommodated by using an updated price vector on the underlying
physical production opportunity set.
In practice, additional considerations may matter in the design of the regulatory
system. It may be unrealistic to assume that a DMU, who is severely ine¢cient
at the outset, is able to eliminate this entirely over-night before the start of the
planning period. To take into account the possible time lag in eliminating initial
ine¢ciency we may proceed as follows.
First, we determine the cost e¢ciency E0 of the unit in question on the historical













Next, we introduce the fraction ± of the DMU’s initial e¢ciency de…cit that it is
able to eliminate per year. Using this, the cost norm in period t becomes









where the last fraction is cost norm in period t, assuming no individual productivity
catch-up by DMUi and the …rst factor accounts for the cumulative impact of the
limited ±-catch up per period. The factor ±is set such that the total required
catch-up never exceeds the initial ine¢ciency during the regulatory period





E.g., if the initial e¢ciency is Ei
0 =0 :75 and the annual catch-up ± =1 2 % ,w e
initially allow the cost norm to be in‡ated by 1
Ei
o = 1
0:75 =1 :33 and the annual





=1¡ 0:12 ¢ 0:25 = 0:97; resulting in
a net extension of cost norm of 1:33 ¢ 0:97 = 1:29in period 1, 1:25in period 2, etc.
Hence, a DMU with an excess cost of 33% at the outset of the regulatory period is
only required to reduce its ine¢ciency down to 25% excess cost after two years.
















t =1 ;::;T (6.3)
As a …nal remark, if we want to allow for system wide declines in productivity,
we could also eliminate the earlier observations in the estimation. The disadvan-
tage of using such cost norms, that are more sensitive to new information, is that
idiosyncratic variations from year to year create signi…cant payment uncertainties.
This, the trade-o¤ between capturing system wide variations and running the risk
of capturing idiosyncratic variations, is the general trade-o¤ faced when we go from
…xed to more relative performance or tournament-like payment schemes.MULTI-PERIOD DEA INCENTIVE REGULATION IN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION 11
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Figure 2. Timeline for the Norwegian electricity distribution regulation.
7. The Norwegian Scheme
In this section, we review the Norwegian Regulatory Scheme for electricity dis-
tribution and show the clear resemblance to the schemes discussed above. Based
on documents from the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Administration,
NVE, such as NVE (1997) and Grasto (1997), and the independent work reported
in Kittelsen (1994, 1996, 1997), the regulatory model of the Norwegian distribution
market is summarized. The legal framework is based on the Norwegian Energy Act
of 1991, separating production and transmission of electric power. The production
and sales activities were deregulated into an open market, later pooled in a joint
Scandinavian power exchange with Sweden and Denmark. The distribution re-
mains a natural monopoly based on concession holding and delivery requirements.
The distributors were subject to a rate of return regulation during 1992-1996, in
January 1997 replaced by an ex ante revenue cap system with an e¢ciency in-
centive. The period of regulation is (initially) a …ve-year period, 1997-2001 and
the e¢ciency incentive is based on reported performance in 1994-1995. The time
perspective of the regulatory regime is illustrated in Figure 2. Two years before
the start of the regulation period, the regulator assesses cost ine¢ciencies. During
the period individual annual revenue caps are set by the regulator, based on pre-
viously assessed ine¢ciencies, reported costs and projected future demand. After
a full regulatory cycle (5 years), the complete earnings of the distributor are re-
viewed. If the distributor cannot show the minimum rate of return in average over
the period, overcharging of the customers is authorized during the following period.
Analogously, if the maximum permitted rate of return has been exceeded, the ex-
cess pro…t will be distributed to the customers through tari¤ reductions. Direct
violations of the revenue cap, windfall pro…ts or -losses, are regulated with interest
after a one-year delay. The interest rate is set to be the base rate of return for
the industry, rb, the riskfree rate of return with a 2% risk premium for uncertainty
regarding regulatory regime.
The core of the regulation is thus an ex ante revenue window, which speci…es the
maximum, minimum and prescribed allowed revenue for the DMU. The maximum
revenue is given as
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where °max denotes the maximum allowed rate-of-return (15% in NVE (1997)),
xcap denotes the capital base of the DMU at time t and ct i st h ea c t u a lc o s ta tt i m e
t. The revenue ‡oor is analogously given as
Rt ¸ °minxcap + ct t =1 ;::;T
where °min denotes the minimum prescribed rate-of-return (2% in NVE (1997)).
This constraint assures the economic survival of the distributor and may have ad-
ditional e¤ects on the cost structure of the industry. It also serves to assure the
uninterrupted distribution of power to all consumers as a mean to induce regional

















where kt;t¡1 is an in‡ation adjustment factor, yt
pow is the gross output of power
at time t, ¼ is an imposed cost e¢ciency requirement (1.5% in NVE (1997)) (a
proportional revenue reduction), E0 is the historical cost e¢ciency at time 0 in the
DEA model as above, Emin is a lower curbing of e¢ciency scores1 (0.70 during 1999)
and ´ is the annual e¢ciency catch-up factor (3% in NVE (1997)). Fundamentally,
the regime is a CPI-X revenue cap with an individualized X, …xed over an horizon.
The improvement factor X is composed of a general term ¼ and an individual
component ´:Thus, it re‡ects the balance between a prevalent ine¢ciency among
all distributors and the individual, relative ine¢ciency demonstrated by the DMU
compared to other operators. In this sense, the regulator mounts an e¤ort to reduce
endemic ine¢ciency as indicated by the empirical studies above, as well as providing
some incentives for frontier catch-up to individual agents.
We will now compare the implemented Norwegian regime with the proposed
dynamic revenue caps with limited catch-up (6.3). In order to arrive at the Nor-
wegian scheme, a series of additional assumptions are necessary. Assume (i) that
the output is single dimensional, my =1 , (ii) that the non-controllable factors are
…xed over time, zi
t = zi
o for t =1 ;::;T, (iii) that the cost model is characterized




0 t =1 ;:::T for some real numbers ki
t 2 R+; and (v) that there
exits an exogenous frontier shift ¼. Now, by the homothetic nature of the cost





0 (presuming allocative e¢ciency on the input side in the historical





































t is a price index and yi
t=yi
0 is as quantity index. Except for the arbitrary
e¢ciency cushion Emin adjustment and the pro…t-slack arbitrage through the ½
factor, this scheme corresponds to the Norwegian model (7.1). Indeed, in the special
1The curbing is introduced as an additional mean of moderating the catch-up requirements for
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(1¡ ¼ ¡ ±(1 ¡ Ei
0))twixi t =1 ;::;T (7.3)
To illustrate the di¤erences and similarities between (7.2) and (7.1), consider
a stylized two-period example with a normalized cost c0 =1 0 0 , ¼ =0 :02;± =
0:10;½ =0 :8;´ =0 :03;°max =0 :153;°min =0 :02 and Emin =0 :70.T h e c a p i t a l
input, xcap =4 7 3 ; based on the average ratio for 180 Norwegian distributors in
NVE (1997b). The e¤ect of gradual e¢ciency improvements is captured by a factor
k,s u c ht h a tc0 = kc1 with k =0 :90;:::;1:60. Certainly, a distributor cannot
reasonably reduce costs more than a certain fraction in any given period due to
binding contracts and inputs that are not transformed by the distributor, such
as transfer fees and depreciation. However, since the maximum k is unknown to
the regulator, the development over the entire range is of potential interest. The
NVE scheme is monotonous for e¢ciency scores E0 between 0:7 and 1:0 and the
Agrell-Bogetoft-Tind scheme (ABT) is monotonous for all E0. Thus, it su¢ces to
select the scores E0 = f1:0;0:7;0:5g to demonstrate the properties of two regulatory
schemes. The resulting revenue caps b1 (ABT) and R1 (NVE) as functions of kare
illustrated in Figure 3. Note that the positive di¤erence between the two curves,
for any E0, indicates a one-period gain for the regulator. The ABT scheme does
not provide any positive pro…t for underperformance, k<1, whereas the NVE
scheme cushions the weaker distributors by the ‡oor °minxcap. Figure 4 illustrates
the operator’s gain R1(k) ¡ c0
k and b1(k) ¡ c0
k , respectively. Here, the explanation
for the regulator’s surplus is given as a lowered informational rent to the distributor
in the ABT system, thanks to the pro…t-slack arbitrage. However, there is always
a positive incentive to reveal the true cost function, i.e., to reveal the maximum k
in the one-period setting.
A closing note may be made on a particularity in the NVE scheme. For a capital
base lower than the average, the NVE pro…t ceiling °maxxcap will form a horizontal
plateau in Figure 4. An operator has subsequently no incentive to reveal any higher
improvement factor kthan to the beginning of this horizontal segment. The ABT
scheme is una¤ected by this problem.
This modest example does not illustrate the principal di¤erence vis-a-vis the ex
ante revenue cap, the sequential updating of the cost norm. This feature would
further accelerate the individual productivity catch-up in a regulatory application,
while simultaneously lowering the informational rents of the distributor and poten-
tially safeguarding against industry-wide shocks.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the regulation of the electricity distribution
industry and suggested a regulatory framework for the multiple-input, multiple-
output, multiple-period case based on e¢ciency benchmarking and incentive theory.
We have shown that the previously developed theory has a practical implementation
and that the potential gains for the regulator are positive compared to the popular

























Figure 3. The revenue caps b1 and R1 for k = c1=c0 under the



























Figure 4. The informational rents b1 ¡ c1 and R1 ¡ c1 for k = c1=c0.MULTI-PERIOD DEA INCENTIVE REGULATION IN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION 15
CPI-X model: (i) the risk of bankruptcy, (ii) risk of excessive rents, (iii) the ratchet
e¤ect, (iv) the arbitrariness of the parameters CPI and X, and (vi) the inability
to accommodate changes in the output pro…le. The approach is illustrated with
a numerical comparison against the Norwegian DEA-based regulation, which is a
CPI-X model with an individualized X factor.
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